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I. Introduction 
 
The expansion of competition law to more than 100 jurisdictions worldwide 
presenting different degrees of economic, social and institutional development raises 
important questions as to the appropriate design of competition law regimes. We 
have identified elsewhere, theoretically, the set of factors that limit the effectiveness 
of a competition law regime.1 This chapter extends that analysis in an empirical 
exploration of these factors. We consider that the following factors restrict the 
effectiveness of a competition enforcement regime: (i) vested interests that dominate 
economic policy making, either through legal means (party financing, lobbying, 
influence in the nomination of the government, senior officials or the council of the 
national competition authority (NCA)), or illegal means (corruption, abuse of public 
service power, or cronyism); (ii) inefficient public administration and regulatory 
systems that limit the capacity and effectiveness of public bodies, including the NCA, 
and (iii) inefficient judicial systems that preclude the sanctioning of violations of the 
competition law.  
Section 2 of this paper discusses the linkage between growth and competition 
law. There is a considerable literature documenting the effect of a vigorous 
competition policy on growth. We consider that competition policy includes a number 
of public policies promoting competition on the market, some of which are less 
technology or resources intensive than others. Trade policies and market 
liberalization usually require the opening of the market and the erosion of trade and 
regulatory barriers, while the adoption of a competition law regime requires the 
establishment of enforcement institutions that should operate in the existing 
institutional environment of the country, sometimes at considerable costs and risk. 
We argue that different instruments should be used according to the level of 
institutional development of each country. Our study thus links the adoption of 
antitrust law (competition law regimes) with the development and growth stage of a 
particular jurisdiction. For developing countries with weak institutions, we argue that 
priority should be given to building the market economy and using the entire panoply 
of economic policies to promote competition. If a competition authority is set up, 
priority should be given to competition advocacy and to push the role of competition 
policy in external trade, privatization, and industrial policies rather than on pursuing 
complex antitrust cases with little effect. 
Section 3 provides the theoretical foundation of the chapter. We create a law and 
economics enforcement model, based on the regulation theory of Glaeser and 
Shleifer2. We argue that competition law regimes should be designed according to 
the institutional level of development of the country. Below a certain level of 
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development there is little support for a competition law regime because the 
implementation of the regulatory system requires a high level of information and a 
high level of enforcement capacity by the judicial system. It also requires a certain 
balance of power among economic agents. Once those pre-requisites are satisfied, 
the model specifies at least two regimes of enforcement that are distinguished by the 
level of institutional capacity, one which is rules based, and the upper level quite 
similar to the regime found in the most developed jurisdictions, such as the United 
States or the European Union. 
The most difficult part of the theory is to provide more content and detail to the 
model. Section 4 uses a “revealed preference” approach in conjunction with a model 
of an efficient competition law regime to characterize empirically different regimes. In 
fact, the approach taken is to look around the world and see which countries have 
established a competition enforcement regime and then to try to characterize each of 
the regimes. This methodology uses the premise that the real world is the best 
laboratory to test what is required for an efficient competition law regime. Thus, 
section 4 defines a model of different efficiency levels in an enforcement regime.  
Section 5 characterizes the efficiency of the enforcement regimes using three 
types of indicators: competition authority capabilities in terms of the competition act, 
personnel, and financial resources. The Section then uses these indicators to study 
the properties of their statistical distributions. Section 6 analyzes the factors that 
influence competition law enforcement using statistical and econometric analysis. 
Section 7 tries to identify the pre-requisites for the different policy regimes of 
competition law enforcement, based on the empirical analysis. Section 8 specifies 
the policy implications from the theoretical and empirical models, section 9 
addresses the role of international organizations and the following section concludes.   
 
II. Growth, development and competition law regimes 
 
There are important empirical indications that more competition enhances the 
development potential of an economy. The starting point is that the basis of a market 
economy is the operation of the markets and the process of rivalry that sets markets 
in motion (competition). The new microeconomics of development has shown the 
central role of the mechanism discovered by Adam Smith regarding the link between 
the division of labor and market dimension. The process of development is 
characterized by specialization and productivity increases associated with the 
division of labour that is only possible with market expansion and multiplication3. A 
different strand in the literature focuses on the dynamics of firms, their turnover of 
firms, entry and exit strategies, or their growth and success in successive waves of 
technological growth. This is, to some extent, the Schumpeterian process of 
“destructive creation.” There are thus two processes operating at the micro level—
the shift of resources from less productive to more productive firms, and the 
expansion of the more productive firms by technological improvements. These two 
mechanisms: (1) the division of labor with market expansion, and (2) the dynamics 
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of firms that lead to productivity increase are largely driven by competition. The main 
link in today’s Industrial Organization models is between competition and dynamic 
efficiency.4 
There is important empirical evidence that competition is linked to growth in 
developed countries. Disney et al.5 conclude that competition increases productivity 
levels and the rate of growth of productivity. Recently, Bloom and van Reenen6 show 
that good management practices are strongly associated with productivity and those 
are better when product market competition is higher. Finally, an efficient market for 
corporate control with open rules for takeovers reinforces the impact of competition 
on productivity7. Other studies by Blundell et al.8 and Aghion and Griffith9 also 
confirm the above results. A study about Australia shows that competition enhancing 
reforms in the 1990s contributed to an increase in GDP.10  
There has also been some research linking competition and growth with regard to 
developing countries. Dutz and Hairy11 find that competition policy has a positive 
impact on growth, even after taking into consideration the contribution of trade and 
institutional policies. Reviewing a large number of studies in the 1990s, Tybout12 
concludes that there is evidence that protection increases price-cost margins and 
reduces efficiency at the margin, and that exporters (firms that succeed in the 
international market) are more efficient than non-exporters. Using a new data set for 
Latin America, Haltiwanger et al.13 confirm that trade liberalization and competition 
lead to higher levels of efficiency at the firm level and also to reallocation of 
resources to more productive sectors. Using data for Colombia, Eslava et al.14 
observed that the trade and financial reforms of the 1990s were associated with 
productivity increases resulting of reallocation from low to high productivity firms. 
Similar evidence has been produced for Chile15 and Brazil16 due to trade 
liberalization and for India due to the elimination of the Raj licensing scheme.17 
Aghion et al.18 produced evidence that increasing competition in South Africa 
manufacturing should have “large productivity effects.” Aghion and Schenkerman19 
even found situations where countries can find themselves in a competition trap that 
blocks growth. Those most vulnerable situations are when the initial level of 
competition is low, the initial degree of cost asymmetry among firms is low, and 
politicians are less driven by social welfare concerns. 
It is also widely accepted that competition can also promote institutional 
innovation and the emergence of efficient institutions that support economic growth. 
This becomes clear if one focuses on Olson’s20 theory of collective action and the 
concept of distributional coalition, which is a group whose collective action can 
secure a larger share of the resources generated by the economy to its members, at 
the expense of the population at large, to explain why some countries grow and 
others stagnate. In a stable society distributional coalitions gradually find way to 
solve their collective action problems. Once they are formed and established they 
prefer the status quo and are likely to oppose innovations that would increase the 
growth rate of the economy. Thus, coalitions can trap a society into a stagnant 
economic state. Competition becomes thus a key factor for efficient institutional 
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change21. This conclusion is supported by a wealth of literature. Parente and 
Prescott22 presented a formal model that captures the idea that insider groups that 
operate with a given technology may oppose the introduction of innovations and thus 
block economic growth. Grossman and Helpman23 built a simpler, but very insightful 
model, to explain why there are different protection rates in external trade by 
industries and sectors.24 In their model special-interest groups, organized in lobbies, 
make contributions in order to bias the government choice of trade policy in their 
favour. Politicians maximize a two-part welfare function that depends on those 
contributions collected and the welfare of voters at large, because they need them 
for re-election. The need for party financing and particularly campaign financing in a 
democratic state leads politicians to put “protection for sale”. The model generates a 
set of protection rates that obey a Ramsey modified rule. This is a type of common 
agency problem where an agent (the government or political party) acts in the name 
of several principals (interest groups), while bearing a cost for the implementation of 
the policy in terms of welfare costs of protection.25 Mitra26 extended the work of 
Grossman and Helpman to show that greater inequality in income or wealth 
distribution leads to a higher rate of rent extraction from lobbies and thus lowers 
social welfare. He also demonstrated that industries with higher capital intensity, 
which are more concentrated and have inelastic demand have stronger lobbies.27 A 
test of the “protection for sale” model by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay28 for the US 
gives high marks to that theory. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti29 also tackled an 
issue in the line of Parente-Prescott: a change in policy by the government against 
vested interests would increase the level of development, because societies can be 
trapped with the “inappropriate institutions” and relatively backward technologies. 
They showed in their model the existence of a dynamic equilibrium and the possible 
occurrence of a political economy trap where capitalists bribe the government in 
order to maintain a regime of monopoly rents with low competition that ends up 
blocking growth over the long-term. Such trap is more likely in societies with weak 
(more corruptible) institutions. 
An additional strand of the literature links competition, rents and corruption. 
Andes and di Tela30 built a model of compensation and corruption for government 
agencies.31 They claim that when the principal (the people) pursues multiple and 
diffuse objectives, state contingent contracts with the agent (government) are hard to 
write and rents have to be allocated to enhance performance. A similar agency 
problem may occur between another principal (government) and the agent being the 
bureaucracy. The authors use an efficiency wage theory to determine the optimal 
level of corruption. When a firm under the influence of a bureaucrat enjoys rents, the 
value of his control rights is high. Bureaucrats can trade part of this control in 
exchange for bribes. Then, in a regime of monopolies, with higher rents, there would 
be higher level of corruption compared with a more competitive world. In fact, their 
empirical analysis corroborates this view. The problem is particularly acute in an 
oligarchy and when those vested interests represent small groups, like traditionally 
powerful family groups. 
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In the absence of competition policy, the economy will suffer from distortions with 
static and dynamic effects, the increased rents provided to vested interests would 
deepen inequality and may decrease the productivity of the economy by deviating 
resources from more productive to less productive sectors or industries, blocking the 
entry of new firms and preventing the process of creative destruction to take place. 
As a consequence, the economic production would be limited inside the Production 
Possibility Frontier due to the misallocation of resources. The first empirical work that 
tried to measure these effects directly around the world has been undertaken at the 
World Bank by Kaufman and others under the umbrella of “governance and capture”. 
Kaufman calls this type of behavior “legal corruption”, in the sense that corporations 
can lobby or obtain certain policy measures that may not be illegal but increase their 
rents at the cost of social welfare. Transparency International that collects data on 
corruption does not cover this type of behavior, and has proposed the concept of 
“misuse of entrusted power for private gains”.32  
One of the pioneering works on state capture by firms and its implications was 
carried out by the World Bank on Transition economies at the end of the 1990s.33 
According to the authors, the “leviathan” state is being replaced by the oligarchs who 
“capture the state”, the policy and law environment is moulded to the captor firm’s 
advantage, at considerable social cost. Based on the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey they study three potential interactions between the 
firms and the state in 21 transition countries: (i) administrative corruption: when firms 
make illicit and non-transparent private payments to public officials to alter 
administrative regulations; (ii) state capture: when firms make illicit and non-
transparent private payments to public officials in order to influence the formation of 
laws, rules, regulations or decrees by state institutions, including the courts; and (iii) 
influence: extent to which firms influence the formation of those laws or decrees 
without recourse to payments. The private gains to capture are quite substantial. 
They find that captor firms grew about four times more than other firms in high 
captured countries, but in the regression results it seems that capture does not lead 
to higher levels of investment.34 It is not only incumbent firms that engage in capture. 
There is a sample of new entrants that also engages in capturing in order to get 
more secure property rights and contractual advantages.  
This brief literature review highlights that the main challenge for reformers is 
to structure institutions that limit the influence of vested interests in policy 
formulation, reduce their rent extraction and give a major voice to the interests that 
embody social welfare. Most of the literature in competition policy takes, however, 
for granted that the existing socio-political institutions may control excess economic 
and political power as well as the role of vested interests and does not integrate 
institutions in the analysis. The fact that competition policy seems to promote 
growth, in general, does not, however, mean that each country, whatever its 
institutional or economic development, should adopt a competition law regime. 
A distinction should be established here between competition law regimes 
and competition policies. Competition policies give the framework for markets and 
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thus largely influence resource allocation required for economic development. In 
fact, a discussion of competition policies and other policies that are related with the 
functioning of the market should precede any discussion of competition law regimes. 
They are the context in which competition law enforcement takes place. For 
instance, can we discuss, in a small developing country, abuses of dominance if 
there are high barriers to external trade or if large parts of the economy are 
monopolized? Or, what is the purpose of having a competition authority if 
government favours the formation of national champions? These policies that are 
more directly related with the functioning of the market and that can promote more 
competitive outcomes are market infrastructure policies, external trade policies, 
entry and exit of firms policies, licensing, privatization, investment policies, 
procurement, regulation and innovation policies. Some of them are more technology 
and resource intensive than others. In developing countries structural policies 
regarding the formation and functioning of markets are more important and are the 
pre-condition for any competition law regime. These are all policies that have to be 
taken into account when defining a competition law regime. They constitute the 
foundation in which a competition law regime operates.  
Based on this distinction, we argue that the link between competition and 
development is not uni-dimensional, that is competition promotes growth, but it 
should also be accepted that the level of development of a country is a factor that 
determines the type of competition law regime that will be adopted, or not, and, more 
generally, the design of a competition policy strategy. A one size competition law 
does not fit all levels of development. It follows that for competition policy to become 
optimal, there is a need to integrate to the usual welfare economics and IO models 
employed by competition lawyers and economists the insights of development 
economics. 
One could establish a parallelism with the debate that opposed in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s the proponents of “mono-economics”, that is the claim that 
economics consists of principles of universal validity, with the proponents of the view 
that developing countries have particularities that require a different kind of 
economics35.  The concept of “underdeveloped country” that emerged was 
instrumental in the flourishing of the separate discipline of development economics36. 
The rejection of the mono-economics claim presupposed that underdeveloped 
countries shared a set of specific socio-economic and institutional conditions that set 
them apart from the developed world, thus requiring the adoption of new economic 
strategies to promote development and growth37. The essence of their claim was that 
institutional differences between developed and underdeveloped nations did not only 
affect the speed of economic development but also the path of economic 
development.  
The opposition between these two approaches may now look simplistic. First, the 
proponents of monoeconomics recognized that there are different stages in the 
growth pattern of economies. Most notably, Rostow proposed a theory of growth 
based on five stages that any society must undergo for achieving the higher levels of 
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economic development: (1) the stage of the traditional society, (2) the precondition 
for take-off, (3) the drive to maturity, (4) the age of mass consumption and (5) 
beyond mass consumption38. According to Easterly, Rostow recognized the 
existence of a financing gap for developing economies and suggested methods to 
calculate the necessary investments and financial aid needed from developed 
countries in order to achieve the stage of “take off”39. Second, development 
economics emphasis on the specific characteristics of “underdeveloped countries” 
ignored a number of important micro-economic factors, such as the role of the price 
mechanism40. Third, growth remains an important concern for “developed” 
economies as well, in particular as they are confronted to extended periods of 
economic stagnation and massive unemployment.  
There is a consensus that strong institutions are a prerequisite for the success of 
a growth strategy41. These can be acquired through technology transfer, for example 
the transplantation of a successful reform (e.g. the adoption of a competition law 
statute and the creation of a competition agency), as one can learn from the 
institutional arrangements prevailing elsewhere without incurring the costs of building 
institutions from scratch, or by employing an experimental approach that will give 
space to local knowledge, in case the requisite technology should be highly specific 
to local conditions42. Our position is that whichever option is chosen, it is unavoidable 
that the local conditions and, more specifically, the local institutional environment will 
play an important role in the implementation of the reforms, either at the policy level 
or the meta-level of social norms. This explains the wide variety of enforcement of 
newly adopted competition law statutes in several parts of the world, even if they 
were inspired by the same competition law models. As we will explain, in some 
circumstances, adopting a competition law regime might produce social costs. 
Transplanting a competition law statute or establishing an agency is not the whole 
part of the story. The establishment of a regime of competition law requires thus 
some form of social infrastructure and should fit to the institutional capabilities of 
each jurisdiction. We employ a law and economics model of competition law 
enforcement to derive useful conclusions as to the different stages of competition 
law regimes. 
 
III. A Law and Economics Model of Competition Law Enforcement 
 
We will focus only on the antitrust law regime, i.e., the competition law and its 
enforcement. We argue that for each level of institutional development there is an 
optimal degree of differentiation in the competition rules that minimizes costs of 
information and transaction. But these rules also vary with the level of institutional 
development. Individual fines imposed by the law and actually enforced have to be 
higher than the per case subversion costs (legal costs, bribing, lobbying costs plus 
political costs). Moreover, the probability of being detected times unit costs of 
subversion has to be higher than the opportunity cost to the firm which is restricting 
competition. Thus, if the level of capture of the government is high and the costs of 
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subversion are rather low, it is doubtful that any competition statute would ever be 
enforced effectively. In fact, antitrust law might be even used for favoring interest 
groups and extortion. 
We define three regimes based on Glaeser and Shleifer’s regulatory state 
theory.43 In Regime I there is an environment of weak law and order. Introducing a 
competition law enforcement is difficult because it would elicit extortion at a higher 
social cost.44 Due to the importance of vested interests in the economic policy, the 
main role of competition law is in advocacy to influence the formulation of external 
trade and industrial policies. 
In less developed countries, there are a large number of markets which are either 
inexistent or inefficient. There might be a serious lack of physical infrastructure. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of information and legal networks for the operation of 
markets, which enhances informal arrangements. In this case, the primary role of 
competition policy should be to concentrate on building a market economy. By 
reducing tariffs and quantitative restrictions, external competition penetrates into the 
country, eliminating inefficient industries and firms, and reallocating resources 
towards the sectors where the country has competitive advantages. However, since 
a large number of these developing countries are major commodity exporters to the 
world market, issues of monopoly in the domestic and international markets may 
cause restrictions in production and affect incentives for farmers. For the nontradable 
sectors, naturally protected from competition, privatization policies are usually major 
determinants of market concentration in telecom, energy, transport and other service 
sectors. Equally relevant are the influence of procurement and licensing policies for 
shaping market competition levels. Regulatory barriers to entering and exiting 
markets as well as other business policies also may condition competition by 
restricting entry and thus promoting monopolization.  
Regime II corresponds to a lower intermediate level of institutional 
development where the country already has a minimum level of democracy (see 
infra). In this regime, the country already has surpassed a minimum level of 
education, mainly at the secondary level, that reflects on the maturity and efficiency 
of the operation of its institutions. More specifically for a competition law regime, the 
country needs to have an administrative and judicial system with a minimum of 
efficiency. In this case the country may adopt a simplified system of law 
enforcement, where rules, as opposed to standards, play a major role.  
Once the country has climbed up in the institutional development ladder to an 
upper middle level, it enters into the first window of Regime III where it can attempt 
to resolve disputes based on negligence and private litigation. As we will see below, 
only developed countries (in the sense of the World Bank) should enter this regime. 
The country already needs to have a well-developed institutional system in terms of 
law and order. These attributes include: administrative and judicial capabilities that 
reflect the independence of the regulators and courts from the influence of executive 
branch and major businesses. Empirical observations suggest a two tiered system in 
Regime III, with two levels of fines and important requirements of information in the 
 10 
 
procedural aspects of competition law. However, only a case by case analysis will 
dictate in which of these tiers a country should be.  
In the last window of Regime III, the country has strengthened institutions in such 
a way that the political, administrative, and judicial systems are subject to checks 
and balances and are largely immune to capture by vested interests. In this case, the 
country can introduce strict liability as the rule with private litigation functioning as the 
main instrument of law enforcement. High fines have a high dissuasive effect. In this 
regime, societies can reap of all the benefits of modern competition law enforcement.  
 
IV. What Characterizes an Effective Competition Law Regime? 
 
Like in so many fields of economics, we are going to take a “revealed preference 
approach” in characterizing competition law regimes. That is, let us look around the 
world and see how different competition law regimes operate and then infer what 
characterizes them. 
The first element of a competition law regime is the introduction of the 
competition law itself. However, there are no two competition laws exactly alike. 
They differ in both substantive and process matters. We classify competition laws 
according to the following criteria: 
 Coverage. Does the law apply to all sectors of economic activity, including 
public enterprises and public entities, when performing commercial activities? 
 Substantive law. Does it explicitly prohibit cartels and coordinating practices? 
Does it prohibit abuses of dominant position, and in particular predatory 
practices and maintains an open access to essential facilities? Does it control 
mergers that may lessen substantially competition? 
 Procedural law. Does it safeguard the rights of defence and due process? Is 
the process transparent, does it protect commercial secrets and allow the 
parties to access information? Is there judicial control of the National 
Competition Authority’s (NCA) decisions? Does it sanction violations of the 
law, does it establish fines, and are they significant? 
The classification is from 1=weak competition law to 5=strong competition law. To 
get the maximum points the competition law has to fulfill all the above criteria.  
The second element is the creation of a national competition agency. The 
starting point to assess a regime is simply to measure the capabilities of the agency 
and its resources. The legal, human and financial capabilities of the agency are the 
most important. The competition law and its statutes establish the legal capabilities 
of the agency. The human capabilities are given by the number of professionals 
(economists and lawyers or sector experts). Ideally we should also consider their 
qualifications in terms of academic curriculum and experience, and the leadership 
and independence of the executive council, but we reserve such analysis for a later 
stage of this project. The financial resources are given by the annual budget of the 
NCA. All the indicators for resources and performance, as discussed below, refer to 
the activities of an NCA with regard to competition enforcement. We exclude from 
 11 
 
our analysis state aid control, consumer protection, or any other regulatory function 
that the NCA may perform. 
Our index of NCA capacity is given by a weighted average of professionals 
and financial resources divided by the population of the country in thousands. We 
can also examine if there are economies of scale in NCAs or if there is a minimum 
number of professionals to become effective.  
Thus far we have examined the institutional infrastructure of competition law. 
The next step is to measure its effectiveness. The measure of effectiveness has to 
be taken in relation to the aims of NCAs. The roles of competition authorities usually 
comprise investigatory and sanctioning functions relative to the administrative 
enforcement of the competition law, supervisory and regulatory functions, and 
advocacy and advising functions.  
The most important role of a NCA is undoubtedly to investigate unlawful 
behavior or practices and to sanction undertakings to dissuade market participants 
from engaging in anti-competitive behavior or practices. Our first focus would thus be 
on restrictive practice cases. We started by collecting the number of competition 
cases decided by the NCAs in a given year. We should be careful not to confuse 
with the number of cases pending or reported, as well as the number of complaints, 
which usually exceeds largely the number of cases opened by the NCAs. However, 
there is a large differentiation in the importance, coverage and complexity of cases. 
For computing our index of enforcement, we considered only the number of cases 
that had a substantial impact on the economy, measured by national impact and 
relevance of the industry and only cases that implied some sanction. We recognize 
the difficulty in measuring this variable that should also reflect the quality of the case, 
but this is an area for further research. Cases are then classified according to the 
type of restrictive practice.  
Most of the NCAs with modern statutes control mergers that have an impact 
on the domestic economy. We do not consider that indicators of number of mergers 
analyzed have a special meaning for enforcement, since they depend very much on 
thresholds and merger activity in the country and for a given year. We considered as 
most relevant the number of mergers that were either prohibited or where major 
remedies were imposed.45 
It is well accepted that the level of dissuasiveness of a legal regime depends 
on the expected losses to the violator of the law. One of the variables is related to 
the number of cases decided by the NCA,46 the other is the amount of fines imposed. 
We collected this data from the reports of the NCAs. We measure the level of 
enforcement of the NCA by an average of the three above indicators divided by the 
population (in thousands): number of restrictive practices cases, number of mergers 
prohibited or where major remedies were imposed and the amount of the fines in 
millions of USD. 
However, it is not enough to have a measure of the level of enforcement 
related to the activity of the NCA. All competition authorities are subject to judicial 
control. What effectively counts for undertakings is the final decision of the court. In 
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fact, even in relatively developed countries a non negligible number of decisions of 
NCAs are either annulled or sometimes fines are substantially reduced by courts. In 
developing countries and with younger authorities, NCAs face many difficulties in 
having their decisions upheld by courts. We try to measure first how effective in 
general the judicial system is by using several indicators available in databases, 
such as the World Bank Governance Database.47 We then use information regarding 
the number of decisions that have been upheld by courts and available in the annual 
reports of the NCAs to compute an indicator on how effective are courts in deciding 
on competition matters. This indicator varies from 1=worst to 5=best system. By 
using an average of the previous indicator (which has been normalized) and the 
judicial control indicator, we have a final indicator of the effectiveness of the 
competition law regime. 
 
V. How Have Competition Law Regimes Spread Around the World 
 
We have studied 101 countries. The data collected for each country centers in 
2006, and when data was available, our estimate is the average for three or four 
years. The data was collected from the annual reports of activities published in the 
sites of the NCAs and from OECD and UNCTAD peer reviews. In our sample, there 
are 80 countries with a competition law and 67 countries with an active competition 
law regime, i.e., having instituted a NCA. The indices for each country are in the 
Annex.  
We started by studying the NCA capabilities which measure the human and 
financial resources of the authorities. A country without a NCA with a minimum level 
of resources can hardly be considered as having a competition law enforcement 
regime. Figure 1 plots the Index of NCA capabilities against the GDP income per 
capita (GNI, Atlas method, for 2005, from the World Bank databases).  
As we can see from Figure 1 there are 38 countries either without a NCA or with 
an NCA with extremely limited resources in our sample of 101 countries. Of the 
remainder 63 countries, there are 33 countries with NCAs with very limited 
resources, as well as in some highly developed countries.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of NCAs by their capabilities 
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According to our experience, there is a rule of thumb for the capabilities of a NCA to 
be considered effective. The rule is that it should have about 5 to 7 professionals 
(economists and lawyers, mostly case handlers) for each 1 million population.48 For 
small economies there may be a minimum scale of an office of no less than 8 to 10 
professionals, otherwise it would be difficult to fulfill all the functions normally given 
to a NCA. Obviously, the financial resources depend on the wages of public servants 
in the country. However, the required qualifications of the lawyers and economists of 
an NCA are among the highest in the country, since they are confronting the best 
lawyers and economists that would be hired by the most powerful firms in the 
country. This benchmarking would give an Index of capabilities of around 1. Only 12 
NCAs satisfy these criteria. 
Among EU countries, and given their populations, Belgium,49 Germany, 
Austria, Spain, and Slovenia were seriously understaffed and under resourced for 
the period under analysis.50 The countries with the best endowed NCAs are New 
Zealand, Australia, Denmark, and Norway. 
There are only 12 countries with a NCA placed in the upper 70 percent of the 
range of the distribution. Thus, a major conclusion of this chapter is that 
governments around the world have not placed competition law enforcement among 
their highest priorities, and have generally not endowed their NCAs with sufficient 
resources for effective enforcement.51 No country with a GDP per capita below 
13,570 USD has a Competition Authority that is well resourced.  
Next we looked at the level of NCA competition enforcement. Figure 2 gives 
the histogram of the NCAs by enforcement level according to the methodology 
described above. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of NCAs by enforcement level 
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The first 38 Authorities were not active, as we saw above. However, there are some 
Authorities that with rather limited resources are able to achieve a substantial level of 
enforcement. Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Hungary, and Slovenia were the 
jurisdictions with the authorities with the highest level of enforcement per resource 
available. 
Figure A.2 plots the Competition Enforcement Index against GDP per capita.52 
The first comment is that the level of enforcement increases with the level of GDP 
per capita. The second is that below the GDP level of 7,800 USD, which 
corresponds to Turkey, there are only 21 countries with a competition law regime out 
of 44, the average index being 0.4. No country below that threshold has an Index 
above 1.6. This seems to be our first threshold, in terms of GDP, that a country has 
to cross in order to have a regime of competition law. Using the terminology of the 
World Bank, only countries in the high end of upper middle income (well above 3,000 
USD) have the capability to maintain an effective competition law regime.  
On the opposite side of the scale, all the countries with an income per capita above 
13,570 USD have an Enforcement Index above 1.6, with an average of 3.53 This 
seems to be a threshold for a Type III Regime. However, as we shall see, other 
indicators of institutional infrastructure are also required. Notice that these are 
countries well above the threshold of high income used by the World Bank (above 
9,200 USD). 
The figures below show the histograms of the overall level of competition 
enforcement around the world (Figures 3 and 4) and only for the countries that have 
a GDP per capita above 13,570 USD. The first shows a 2 peaked distribution, 
excluding the zero observations, which may be due to the fact that countries with low 
level of resources dedicated to competition enforcement are able already to make an 
impression in terms of enforcement, and countries with higher level of resources may 
do a better job in terms of enforcement. By comparing distributions of NCA 
competition enforcement with overall competition enforcement in Figure 4 we see 
that for low levels of NCA enforcement, courts in general contribute to an even lower 
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level of enforcement, the opposite holding in high levels of NCA enforcement. This is 
related with two factors. First, in countries with weak NCAs the overall institutional 
environment is rather weak, including judicial control, which further undermines the 
work of NCAs.54 The second is that weak NCAs may commit more errors in cases 
either in terms of procedure or substantive errors, contributing to a lower level of 
enforcement.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Overall Competition Enforcement by Level of 
Enforcement  
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Distributions of Overall and NCA Enforcement Levels for Developed Countries 
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We started the econometric analysis by regressing the Overall Level of Enforcement, 
for countries with a competition regime, with GDP per capita. The following Figure 
shows the estimated values and the residuals of the regression. 
 
Figure 5: Overall Level of Enforcement by GDP per capita 
 
 
 
The highest positive residuals, meaning that countries are doing more than 
would be expected, giving its GDP per capita, are found for: the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Australia, New Zealand, Hungary, Slovak Republic, France, and Poland. 
At the end of the scale of GDP per capita three notable contributions: Brazil, South 
Africa, and Turkey. If we include private enforcement, the United States jumps to 
number one by far in terms of level of enforcement. 
The highest negative residuals are for Hong Kong, Botswana, Malaysia, 
Mauritius (where a competition regime was recently introduced), Venezuela and 
Uruguay, which have no de facto competition law regime. Among the higher income 
levels the largest residuals are for the United States, Austria, Belgium and Greece. 
The case of the United States should be seen with some reservation because it is 
the country with the most important private enforcement system, which has not been 
included in the statistics. Thus, both capability and enforcement levels are clearly 
understated for this country. We also did not include the European Commission in 
 17 
 
our data base because of difficulties in assigning cases to each Member State, 
which is our unity of analysis. 
 
VI. Factors That Contribute to a Successful Competition Law Regime: 
a Quantitative Analysis 
 
What is the social infrastructure required to have a competition law regime? We 
have to take as given that the constitutional infrastructure is a market economy. If the 
dominant economic ideology of the government is socialist or corporatist, it is not 
even possible to discuss the introduction of competition policy.  
The social infrastructure required to have a regime of competition law involves 
the following dimensions:  
 State and political system with a minimum functioning democratic regime, with 
a separation of powers and checks and balances among the three branches 
of the state, periodic general elections with political parties representing the 
spectrum of society and government with minimum quality, with a minimum of 
political stability, and peace.  
 Public administration and a regulatory system with a minimum of efficiency, 
control (non-discretionary) and not with a high level of corruption. This is 
required for the business environment to operate in terms of licensing, taxes, 
and subsidies. Bureaucratic interferences and control of business activity 
should be fair and in the public interest. 
 Rule of law establishing the following institutions: 
i. Protection of property rights. This is required for a firm to 
operate in a market economy 
ii. Contractual enforcement. All transactions in the market are 
based on formal or informal contracts. 
iii. Judicial system with a minimum level of efficiency. The system 
must be able to enforce i) and ii) with a minimum of predictability 
and in a timely manner, respecting due process.  
The first dimension of the social infrastructure is a general requisite for the 
functioning of a society and the basic system for the economy. A stable and peaceful 
environment is essential for the functioning of the economy. Although a democratic 
regime may not be a sine qua non for development, we think that the exceptions only 
confirm the rule that a democracy with the three branches of government, and 
checks and balances among them, are the basis of a well-functioning market 
economy with rule of law.  
Since antitrust law enforcement is only a part, and sometimes a small part, of 
economic law, and also embedded in the regulatory framework, it requires a 
minimum of efficiency of public administration and regulatory quality. One part of the 
law is usually enforced through administrative bodies and law, so it is intrinsically 
part of the public administration. The other major role is played by courts that control 
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decisions of these administrative bodies and also by private litigation. The judicial 
system plays a major part in law enforcement. 
In short, and as has been developed in a seminal work by Mateus55 which 
offers the conceptual background of this paper, besides (i) democracy, law and order 
and a market-oriented economy; the following factors restrict the effectiveness of a 
competition enforcement regime: (ii) vested interests that dominate economic policy 
making, either through legal means (party financing, lobbying, influence in the 
nomination of the government, senior officials or the council of the NCA), or illegal 
means (corruption, abuse of the public service power, or cronyism); (iii) inefficient 
public administration and regulatory systems that limit the capacity and effectiveness 
of public bodies, including the NCA, and (iv) an inefficient judicial system that 
precludes the sanctioning of violations of the competition law. 
The law and economics model we want to test is a linear combination of these 
factors: 
 
 
 
Where ENF refers to the level of competition enforcement, DEM the level of 
democracy, CEI is the Index of Corporate Governance that measures the legal 
capture index plus the illegal corruption level in the country, ADM is the level of 
efficiency of public administration and JLEI the quality of the judicial system. Other 
variables that could be additionally tested are the level of education, EDU, since the 
efficiency of institutions is higher if the human resources have a higher level of 
education, and GCR, an indicator measuring the business environment or the quality 
of the market economy.  
We used several databases for our research. First, we used the database 
assembled by Kaufman56 and in the World Bank Governance data. Second, we used 
the database on institutions and policy from the Inter-American Development Bank. 
Third, we included the World Bank Doing Business database. Fourth, we used the 
data published in the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Report 
for 2010-2011. Finally, we used data from the World Bank for GDP per capita, 
population and level of education. 
There are a number of indicators available to measure the democratic regime 
(Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit, Polity IV). We took the Economist 
Index of Democracy for 200857 because it has reasonable variance and seems more 
appropriate for our analysis. 
 
Figure 6: Level of Democracy  
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Figure 6 plots the Democracy Index against GDP per capita. By combining 
this Index with the results for enforcement, we conclude that no country has a 
Democracy Index below 7.3, with the exception of Singapore and Slovakia for a 
Regime III type. Turkey, which is the borderline case for a Regime II type, has a 
Democracy Index of 5.7. If we take the estimated values, which are a better cut-off 
point, since they are based on the overall estimation, we obtain the same thresholds. 
We carried out the same exercise for the following variables: Education 
level=Percentage of active population with at least secondary education; Business 
environment=Global Competition Report Index of Competitiveness, which measures 
quality of infrastructure, credit availability, extent of taxation, distortion by subsides, 
burden of regulation, efforts to improve competitiveness and informal sector; 
Institutional level=average of several institutional variables; Corporate Governance= 
legal and illegal capture plus corruption index; Quality of Public Administration and 
Quality of Judicial System are indices collected from the Governance site of the 
World Bank. 
 
Figure 7: Thresholds by competition regime  
 
Variable Regime III Regime II 
Democracy 7.3 5.7 
Education level 23.9 17.9 
Business environment 40.8 30.7 
Institutional level 47.4 39.0 
Corporate Governance 41.0 33.4 
Quality Public 39.5 30.0 
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Administration 
Quality Judicial System 45.1 35.6 
 
In general, a country has to cross the lower 43 percentile of the cumulative 
distribution of institutional and educational levels, worldwide, in order to be able to 
have an enforceable competition law regime (Regime II). And only when it reaches 
the top 20 percent class of the distribution it is ready to have a developed 
competition law enforcement system (Regime III). 
Figures A.3, A.4 and A.5 illustrate the application of the above criteria in classifying 
the different regimes among our sample of countries. Figure A.6 gives the sample of 
countries by enforcement regime, showing the estimated values and the residuals. 
We then proceeded to estimate the factors that contribute to a successful 
competition law enforcement using econometric models. Because part of the sample 
has no competition law, we have to use a censored data model of estimation, also 
known as a Tobit model. We tried several variables, but because of multicolliniarity 
only a few variables explain most of the variance of the enforcement level (ENF).  
Model 1 (Figure 8) explains the Level of Enforcement of the competition law 
regime by the Corporate Governance Indicator (CORP), Educational Level (EDU) 
and Level of Democracy (DEM). All variables are significant and the overall 
estimators of the equation have a good adherence. Model 2 is not very different from 
the first one, where the enforcement level is explained again by the Level of 
Education and Level of Democracy, and the third factor is an overall Institutional 
Indicator (INST) that includes Corporate Governance and the quality of Public 
Administration (ADM) and the Level of the Judicial System. 
A variable representing the efficiency of the Judicial System (JLEI) has always 
a negative sign. Our interpretation is that in most of the countries of our sample the 
judicial system acts on enforcement by reducing its impact, either by annulling 
decisions or reducing fines, usually curtailing its dissuasive power. We rarely see 
legal systems where courts increase fines or take on themselves the power of 
enforcing competition law. There are two reasons for this. The first is the lack of 
competition law and economics knowledge by judges on these matters. The second 
factor is the lack of competition culture and the dominance of vested interests, as 
violation of economic laws is not regarded as particularly serious.58A variant of the 
model with a Censored Logistic instead of a Censured Normal improves very 
marginally the results. Model 3 includes ADM and JLEI separately. 
 
Figure 8: Models explaining the level of enforcement 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CORP
0.012676 
(.007233)
EDU
5.939956 
(1.15617)
5.5716 
(1.1219)
DEM
.30637 
(.09578)
.2610 
(.0957)
.4920 
(.0957)
INST
.01742 
(.00677)
ADM
.0732 
(.0154)
JLEI
 -.0394 
(.0136)
Log likelihhod -120.35 -118.71 -123.76
Left censored obs 38 38 38
Uncensored obs 63 63 63  
 
It is interesting that accessing to the European Union is no more a certification for 
entering into Regime III. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria, and even some of 
the institutionally weaker Eastern European countries, have brought into the EU 
countries that on a substantial number of dimensions are not yet able to fully enforce 
a competition law regime. These countries need special support and a broader 
approach to institutional building than just introducing the “acquis communautaire.” 
Even the OECD has now expanded its membership to countries that are not yet 
ready for Regime III, requiring broader support for their institutional building and 
reinforcing law and order within the context of democratic institutions.  
 
 
VII. Policy Regimes for Competition Law and Institutional Pre-
requisites: a More Detailed Analysis 
 
The previous empirical analysis explained what broad characteristics should be met 
to have an enforceable competition regime. However, further work will need to be 
carried out to find out the finer details of the pre-conditions for each regime. One of 
the types of data we need is more refined and detailed information about institutions. 
Another problem is that the sample of countries with efficient competition law 
regimes is rather limited to test statistically the impact of a multitude of factors.59 
To determine the factors that are important in characterizing the pre-
conditions for each competition law regime, we have to rely on country case studies 
and their experiences through time around the world.60  
The Annex on Criteria for designing competition law regimes specifies each of 
the items of the social infrastructure that in our view should be examined closely. 
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This is the metric broadly suggested by the empirical work and countries´ 
experiences.  
 
VIII. Policy Implications 
 
Regime I is characterized by an environment of weak law and order. Imposing a 
heavy legal and regulatory system would elicit a high social cost.61 Competition 
policy should concentrate on building a market economy. First, emphasis should be 
put in building institutions for law and order, and there is no easy substitute for this 
requirement. A crucial part of competition policy relates to external trade policies. 
Reduction of tariffs and in particular Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) can increase 
competition in the tradable sector, by subjecting exportables and importables to a 
higher level of competition from international trade. Another important policy is to 
eliminate export and import monopolies that sometimes control the most important 
commodities in developing countries and extract rents from farmers. In fact, a large 
number of these developing countries are major commodity exporters to the world 
market, and issues of abusing market power, sometimes on the buying side, are 
important.  
Regime II corresponds to a lower intermediate level of institutional development 
where the country may adopt a simplified system of law enforcement. The country 
should enact a simple competition law and establish an independent Competition 
Authority. High powered incentives (rules based) should be the basis of market 
regulation. Competition law should use simple per se rules covering the following 
core areas: (a) prohibition of cartels, and (b) prohibition of refusals to supply by large 
firms. Such regimes should establish “bright lines” for merger control. These include: 
high levels of turnover for merger notification and prohibition of mergers above a set 
of simple criteria. The country should also establish a competitive system for 
procurement with clear rules, supervised by a National Auditing Court. Also, based 
on the historical experience of the US in the Progressive Era, the following systems 
are important: the introduction of regulation of inputs, basic labor and social laws, 
safety regulations in work, buildings construction, sanitary, medicines, transportation. 
More important than antitrust and probably easier to implement is regulation of 
natural monopolies with high powered incentives (e.g., a price cap is preferable to 
cost based systems) and interoperability and access to basic infrastructure: 
telecommunications, electricity, gas, water, and transportation. It also is very 
important to introduce some regulation of the financial sector to avoid systemic 
problems like supervision of depository institutions, insurance, and capital markets. 
Once the country has climbed up in the institutional development ladder to an 
upper middle level, it enters into the first window of Regime III, where it can attempt 
to resolve disputes based on negligence and private litigation. This would mean in 
terms of antitrust, first of all, rising the amount of the fines for an intermediate level. 
Second, it would entail the introduction of the “rule of reason” in a number of areas of 
competition law and the introduction of a merger control regime based on the 
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principle of “lessening competition.” However, the legal regime would retain some 
“bright lines” like per se prohibition in extreme cases of concentration. 
Finally, we arrive at the last window of Regime III, where the country has 
strengthened institutions in such a way that the political, administrative, and judicial 
systems are almost immune to extortion. In this case, the country can introduce strict 
liability as the rule with private litigation functioning as the main instrument of law 
enforcement, combined with public enforcement providing the possibility of high 
fines. In this regime, the Government should reap all the benefits of modern 
competition law enforcement. The Competition Authority should be entrusted with 
prosecuting violations under public interest (administrative body). The government 
should entrust the Authority with sufficient investigative powers. The Authority should 
set high fines in the law and also apply high fines in real cases. The model of law to 
follow is the standard antitrust law of the United States and the EU, which is 
economically sophisticated to a variable degree. The country is also ready to apply 
leniency programs to detect cartels.62 
The best regime, for countries with this higher level of rule of law, is to combine 
an administrative with a private litigation system. Private enforcement is essential to 
redress damages between parties, to make antitrust more “democratic” and 
understood by citizens.  
From the above it follows that narrowing advice on competition policy to 
competition law and the work of competition authorities is really misguided, even for 
developed countries. A competition law regime will be efficient only if the institutional 
infrastructure enables it.  
For developing countries below Regime II, policy advice should concentrate on 
building the bases of the market economy, the rule of law, external trade, 
procurement, eliminating monopolies using structural measures and reinforcing 
institutions and public administration. The role of international organizations should 
be to support these policies and protect developing countries from international 
cartels and maintain an open trade system for exports of developing countries. This 
does not mean that competition law and a competition authority should not be 
created, but that its role should be geared mainly to create its own capabilities, in 
advocacy supporting those policies and in creating the bases of a market economy 
and competition culture. In general, the largest problem is the sanctioning power of 
the authority which is largely restricted by the institutional framework. 
If the developing country has reached a GDP per capita of 7,500 to 8,500 USD 
(PPP), institutional infrastructure that puts it above the 40th percentile, or an index of 
competition law enforcement clearly above 1.2, the country is ready to enter in 
Regime II, i.e., to have a competition law and competition authority with a minimum 
level of requirements. However, due to the weaknesses of the institutional 
infrastructure, competition law should be biased towards establishing “bright lines” 
and “dark zones” for the anti-competitive behavior. Competition policy should also 
give high priority to regulating natural monopolies and creating conditions for 
provision of infrastructure services at competitive prices. Moreover, we have 
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identified that the judicial system may be one of the major constraints for the success 
of the competition regime, so it needs to be strengthened. International organizations 
can play a major role in supporting and nurturing NCAs that are still in their infancy 
and may confront challenges such as hostile media controlled by large business 
groups. 
Once the country crosses the threshold of about 13,000 to 14,000 USD of GDP 
per capita, in PPP, or the last 20 percent of the cumulative distribution of institutional 
indicators, it is ready to have a fully-fledged competition law regime, with high fines 
and progressively criminal sanctions. Priority should be given to endow the NCA with 
enough legal, human, and financial resources to fulfill all of its obligations. However, 
the institutional framework also should be continuously strengthened. One of the 
main problems is to build an independent competition authority. Policy, even in 
highly developed economies is still prone to manipulation.  
A significant number of cases of competition law regimes below our proposed 
threshold for Regime II are in countries that are either candidate countries for 
accession to the European Union that have or are in the process of acquiring an 
association status or under the European Neighbored Program. Presently, the first 
are Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Potential 
candidates are the Western Balkan countries: Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The European Neighborhood Policy was developed in 
2004, with the following sixteen countries—Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Building a competition law regime 
and approaching their institutions and laws to the “acquis communutaire” is part of all 
the agreements established between the EU and these countries. However, as the 
empirical work shows, they are at different stages of economic and institutional 
development, with countries like Croatia, Turkey and Serbia at a higher stage, and 
countries like Armenia, Albania and Moldova at substantially lower institutional 
development levels. The implication of our analysis is that the approach to these 
countries by the European Commission has to take into consideration their level of 
institutional development in order to establish priorities and the type of competition 
law regime. 
 
IX. Conclusions 
 
We have identified theoretically a set of factors that limit the effectiveness of a 
competition law regime. This study is mainly an empirical exploration of these 
factors. The following factors restrict the effectiveness of a competition enforcement 
regime: (i) the level of democracy, which is an overall indicator of the institutional 
level, (ii) vested interests that dominate economic policy making, either through legal 
means (party financing, lobbying, influence in the nomination of the government, 
senior officials or the council of the NCA), or illegal means (corruption, abuse of 
public service power, or cronyism); (iii) inefficient public administration and regulatory 
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systems that limit the capacity and effectiveness of public bodies, including the NCA, 
and (iv) inefficient judicial system that precludes the sanctioning of violations of the 
competition law.  
The first conclusion is that countries around the world, including a substantial 
number of developed countries, have not provided enough resources for their NCAs 
to fulfill their basic duties (only 12 countries have met or surpassed our proposed 
benchmark). Second, a GDP per capita above 3,500 USD63 is in general required to 
have a competition law enforcement regime. And only countries with a GDP per 
capita above 13,500 USD have an effective competition law enforcement regime 
(our Regime III). Countries with a weak competition law regime are especially 
affected in their performance by the judicial system. Improving the judicial system 
and in particular in the competition area is a priority strategy for these countries. 
We studied several institutional development indicators and their correlation with 
GDP per capita and the thresholds required for a Regime type II and Regime type III. 
The indicators used were the level of democracy, general institutional development, 
completion of secondary education, corporate governance, quality of public 
administration and quality of the judicial system. All were highly correlated with GDP 
per capita, and thus highly correlated with the competition enforcement level. 
In general, only a country which has crossed the lower 40th percentile of the 
cumulative distribution of institutional and educational levels, worldwide, is able to 
have an enforceable competition law regime (Regime II). And only when it crosses 
the top 20 percent class of the distribution is it ready to have a developed 
competition law enforcement system (Regime III). 
Finally, our econometric results confirm to a large extent the theoretical 
model. They show that the most important factors for explaining the level of 
enforcement of a competition law regime are the overall level of democracy, the 
control of vested interests and corruption and the overall level of education of the 
population. 
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ANNEX 
 
Criteria for designing Competition Law Regimes 
 
Before any Competition Law Regime is introduced the country should have the 
following questions satisfactorily answered: 
(i) Does the country have a minimum level of democracy with checks and 
balances working? 
(ii) Does the Political System allow a minimum level of autonomy of the 
Government vis-a-vis the major interest groups? 
(iii) Does the rule of law have a clear protection of property rights and allow 
its enforcement? 
(iv) Does the rule of law allow a minimum level of enforcement of 
contracts? 
(v) Does the country has embraced explicitly a market economy regime, 
embodied in the constitutional laws? 
 
1. Criteria for Regime I: Introduction of a Minimum Standard Law 
After we have answered satisfactorily to the questions above that are a prerequisite 
for the introduction of any system of Competition Law, the country would be ready for 
introducing any Competition Law if the following criteria is satisfied:  
(i) Does the country have a reasonable history of control of corruption at 
public administration level? 
(ii) Does the country have a reasonable level of public administration 
efficiency? 
(iii) Is the judicial system relatively independent form the other branches of 
government and with a minimum level of efficiency (justice and timely 
decisions)? 
(iv) Does it have already a fully functioning market economy? 
a. Is a market economy system incorporated in the Constitution? 
b. Are a significant number of the private goods and services traded in 
markets without price controls or major competition restraints? 
c. Are a significant number of private goods and services produced by 
private firms? 
d. Are the infrastructure sectors either in the state sector or in the 
private sector with some type of control or regulation by the state? 
(v) Has it implemented a serious competition policy? 
a. Is the external trade regime relatively free of quotas and other 
QTRs? 
b. Is the average level of protection below a reasonable threshold (e.g. 
40%)? 
c. Is the government committed to a system of competitive domestic 
markets? 
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(vi) Does it have already capital markets working with a minimum level of 
efficiency? 
(vii) Is there already a reasonable level of economic regulation in the 
following sectors: 
(a) Financial services (banking and insurance) 
(b) Capital markets 
(c) Other infrastructure sectors 
And regarding the Competition Law and the National Competition Authority: 
(viii) Is the Government ready to enact a Competition Law with the minimum 
content specified here? 
(ix) Is the primary purpose of the Government when enacting the law to 
build competitive markets and improve the efficiency of the market 
economy? 
(x) Is the Government ready to control the power of oligopolies and in 
particular of the most powerful economic groups in the country? 
(xi) Is the Government serious about the law and ready to let the NCA 
enforce it? 
(xii) Are there already any sectoral regulators working with a minimum level 
of efficiency? 
(xiii) Is the Government willing to set up an NCA with a minimum level of 
autonomy, headed by competent officials and appropriately financed 
and staffed? 
 
2. Criteria for Regime II: Introduction of a Lower-level Intermediate Standard 
Law 
Once the country has a reasonable history of implementation of competition law (e.g. 
10 years) at the introductory stage, it may be ready to introduce a Lower-level 
Intermediate Standard Law. In order to aced at this stage it needs to satisfy at least 
the following criteria: 
(i) Does the country have the institutions to control corruption and other 
economic crimes at higher state level 
(ii) Are there precedents or strong signals of corruption at the higher level of 
state? 
(iii) Has anybody ever been successfully prosecuted for economic crimes? 
(iv) Does it have already a fully functioning market economy? 
a. Is the majority of the private goods and services traded in markets 
without price controls or major competition restraints? 
b. Is the majority of private goods and services produced by private 
firms? 
c. Are public enterprises treated the same way as private enterprises 
for violations of economic law? 
(xiv) Has it implemented a serious competition policy? 
a. Is the external trade completely free of quotas and other QTRs? 
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b. Is the country a member of WTO? 
c. Is the average level of protection below a reasonable threshold (e.g. 
30%)? 
(v) Does the country have already a minimum level of culture of competition? 
(vi) Is there any teaching of economic laws and are judges aware of those 
laws? 
And regarding the Competition Law and the National Competition Authority: 
(i) Is the Government ready to enact a Competition Law with the minimum 
content specified here and to provide the NCA with expanded 
resources and powers of investigation and adjudication? 
(ii) Has the Government shown already that it supports the NCA in cases 
against the abuse of power of oligopolies and in particular of the most 
powerful economic groups in the country? 
(iii) Does the Government have an history of being serious about the law 
and ready to let the NCA enforce it? 
(iv) Do sectoral regulators have already a reasonable history (e.g. 5 years) 
of decision making and intervention in the sectors? 
(v) Does the NCA have a competent board (economists and lawyers with 
at least 15 years of experience)? 
(vi) Does the NCA have a minimum level of competent staff (15 
economists and 15 lawyers per 10 million population)? 
(vii) Is the NCA appropriately financed (2 million USD per 10 million 
population)? 
(viii) Has the NCA shown a reasonable history of cases of prosecution of 
cartels (2 successful decisions per year per 10 million population), 
abuses of dominance (1 successful decision per year per 10 million 
population) and merger control (blocking 1 major merger per 2 years 
per 10 million population)? 
 
And regarding private litigation: 
(ix) Is there a legal regime that allows enterprises to sue other enterprises 
for obtaining compensation for damages or stopping actions related 
with restraints to competition 
(x) Do the courts have a minimum level of efficiency in dealing with these 
cases? 
 
3. Criteria for Regime III: Introduction of a Higher-Level Intermediate Standard 
Law 
Once the country has a reasonable history of implementation of competition law (e.g. 
5 years) at the previous stage, it may be ready to introduce a higher-level 
Intermediate Standard Law, which is the pre-camera for the fully blown regime of 
advanced countries. It would need to answer satisfactorily to the following points: 
(i) Does it have already a fully functioning market economy? 
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d. Does it have a tradition of policy as a market economy of at least 15 
years? 
e. Has the privatization and liberalization process been completed for 
at least 5 years? 
f. Are public enterprises ever favored or used instrumentally for 
pursuing other than the strict commercial objectives they were 
formed for? 
(ii) Has it implemented a serious competition policy? 
g. Are the subsidy and tax systems relatively neutral according to 
economic activity? 
h. Is the licensing system concerned with competition issues? 
i. Is the procurement system relatively competitive and based on 
international standards? 
(iii) Does the country have any experience in formulating and implementing 
regulatory statutes, e.g. in the financial markets, telecom or energy 
sectors? 
(iv) Does the country have any tradition in giving economic law matters any 
importance? Do courts recognize their importance? 
(v) Are there a reasonable number of cases of prosecution, sentencing 
with high penalties of violators of economic law, and in particular 
corruption of high level? 
And regarding the Competition Law and the National Competition Authority: 
(i) Is the Government ready to enact a Competition Law with the minimum 
content specified here and to provide the NCA with expanded 
resources and powers of investigation and adjudication? 
(ii) Has the Government shown already that it will refrain from intervening 
in cases against the abuse of power of oligopolies and in particular of 
the most powerful economic groups in the country? 
(iii) Is the Government serious about the law and ready to let the NCA 
enforce it? 
(iv) Do sectoral regulators have already a reasonable history (e.g. 10 
years) of decision making and intervention in the sectors? 
(v) Does the NCA have a competent board of a minimum of 5 members 
(economists and lawyers with at least 15 years of experience)? 
(vi) Does the NCA have a minimum level of competent staff (25 
economists and 25 lawyers per 10 million population)? 
(vii) Is the NCA appropriately financed (4 million USD per 10 million 
population)? 
(viii) Has the NCA shown a reasonable history of cases of prosecution of 
cartels (3 successful decisions per year per 10 million population), 
abuses of dominance (2 successful decision per year per 10 million 
population) and merger control (blocking 1 major merger, and 
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imposition of major structural remedies in 3 cases, per 2 years per 10 
million population)? 
 
And regarding private litigation: 
(ix) Do the courts have a minimum level of efficiency in dealing with these 
cases (e.g. 5 major cases per year)? 
(x) Are there specialized sections in courts or specialized courts and 
trained judges for competition law violations? 
(xi) Has the country introduced a class action regime for redressing 
damages to consumers due to violations of competition law? 
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COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT
Data-base on NCA enforcement
NCA Overall 
Has an NCA? Capacity of NCA Level Level
Yes=1,No=0 Resorces Total EnforcementEnforcement
1 Netherlands 1 1.2 2.2 6.6 5.0
2 New  Zealand 1 3.3 4.3 5.4 4.6
3 Australia 1 2.5 3.5 5.4 4.5
4 Hungary 1 0.8 1.8 5.5 4.1
5 France 1 1.0 2.0 3.9 4.0
6 Denmark 1 1.8 2.8 3.9 4.0
7 Germany 1 0.3 1.3 3.3 3.7
8 United Kingdom 1 1.3 2.3 3.3 3.7
9 Ireland 1 0.6 1.6 4.5 3.7
10 Slovak Republic 1 0.6 1.6 3.5 3.3
11 Norw ay 1 1.6 2.6 2.1 3.3
12 Italy 1 0.6 1.6 3.3 3.3
13 Iceland 1 0.9 1.9 3.5 3.3
14 Israel 1 0.5 1.5 1.7 3.1
15 Finland 1 1.3 2.3 1.5 3.1
16 Poland 1 0.5 1.5 2.6 3.0
17 Sw itzerland 1 0.6 1.6 1.1 2.9
18 Sw eden 1 1.1 2.1 2.3 2.9
19 Japan 1 0.5 1.4 2.2 2.8
20 Slovenia 1 0.3 1.3 2.2 2.8
21 Canada 1 0.7 1.6 0.8 2.8
22 South Africa 1 0.1 0.9 0.5 2.7
23 Singapore 1 0.2 0.9 0.4 2.7
24 Cyprus 1 0.8 1.8 1.5 2.6
25 Spain 1 0.2 1.2 1.1 2.4
26 United States 1 0.5 1.5 1.0 2.4
27 Latvia 1 0.2 1.2 0.9 2.4
28 Korea, south 1 0.5 1.3 0.9 2.3
29 Austria 1 0.3 1.3 0.9 2.3
30 Estonia 1 0.2 1.2 0.8 2.3
31 Portugal 1 0.6 1.6 2.1 2.3
32 Czech Republic 1 0.7 1.7 0.7 2.3
33 Belgium 1 0.1 1.1 0.7 2.3
34 Lithuania 1 0.1 1.1 0.6 2.2
35 Taiw an 1 0.6 1.4 0.6 2.2
36 Turkey 1 0.2 1.0 0.3 2.1
37 Brazil 1 0.1 0.9 0.1 2.0
38 Greece 1 0.5 1.3 0.6 1.7
39 Chile 1 0.1 0.9 0.5 1.7
40 Panama 1 0.3 0.9 1.8 1.7
41 Macedonia 1 0.4 1.0 1.7 1.6
42 Mexico 1 0.1 1.1 0.2 1.6
43 Bulgaria 1 0.1 0.9 0.1 1.6
44 Kenya 1 0.0 0.6 0.1 1.5
45 Romania 1 0.2 1.0 0.1 1.5
46 Croatia 1 0.3 0.9 1.4 1.5
47 Indonesia 1 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.5
48 India 1 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.5
49 Moldova 1 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.4
50 El Salvador 1 0.1 0.7 0.7 1.3
51 Armenia 1 0.5 0.9 0.6 1.2
52 Albania 1 0.3 0.9 0.5 1.2
53 Costa Rica 1 0.0 0.6 0.4 1.2
54 Serbia 1 0.6 1.2 0.4 1.2
55 Zambia 1 0.0 0.8 0.3 1.1
56 Tunisia 1 0.1 0.7 0.2 1.1
57 Peru 1 0.0 0.6 0.1 1.0
58 Russia 1 0.2 0.8 0.1 1.0
59 Argentina 1 0.0 0.6 0.1 1.0
60 Ukraine 1 0.0 0.4 0.1 1.0
61 China 1 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.0
62 Thailand 1 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.0
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COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT
Data-base on NCA enforcement
NCA Overall 
Has an NCA? Capacity of NCA Level Level
Yes=1,No=0 Resorces Total EnforcementEnforcement
63 Algeria 1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0
64 Malaw i 1 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0
65 Nigeria 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
66 Botsw ana 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
67 Hong Kong SAR 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
68 Malaysia 1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
69 Ghana 1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
70 Namibia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
71 Egypt 1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
72 Philippines 1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
73 Jamaica 1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
74 Sri Lanka 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
75 Morocco 1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
76 Colombia 1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
77 Mauritius 1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
78 Jordan 1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
79 Vietnam 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
80 Uganda 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
81 Tanzania 1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
82 Madagascar 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
83 Mali 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
84 Ethiopia 1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
85 Pakistan 1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
86 Georgia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
87 Mozambique 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
88 Venezuela 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
89 Dominican Republic 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
90 Bangladesh 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
91 Uruguay 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
92 Guatemala 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
93 Bosnia-Herzegovina 1 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0
94 Ecuador 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
95 Chad 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
96 Nicaragua 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
97 Honduras 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
98 Angola 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
99 Bolivia 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
100 Paraguay 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
101 Senegal (WAEMU) 1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
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